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This paper was born from an interest in how modern and contemporary Japanese phi-
losophy engaged with Confucianism. Much was written about the political manipula-
tions of the Confucian vocabulary between the late Meiji period and the end of WWII, 
yet such accounts tend to conclude in the summary dismissal of Confucianism’s philo-
sophical potential, especially within the postwar Japanese milieu. In this context, the 
ethical philosophy of Watsuji Tetsurō seems to provide an excellent start to explore and 
ultimately reframe this potential, as his writings not only span both the prewar and 
postwar periods, but they also reveal Watsuji’s constant engagement with Confucianism 
throughout his later career. More specifically, I will explore the Confucian dimension of 
his ethical system by focusing on the dynamic of the universal-in-particular-and-particu-
lar-in-universal ( 普遍性／特殊性 ) in three of his essays ― The History of Ethical Thought 
in Japan (Nihon rinri shisōshi), Ethics (Rinrigaku), and Confucius (Kōshi).
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Alongside Nishida Kitarō, Watsuji Tetsurō is regarded as one of 
the most influential philosophers of the 20th century, who more or 
less set the basis for the field of ethics in Japan. 1  His ethics of in-
betweenness (aidagara) ― the non-dualistic, mutually defining rela-
tionship between the individual and their community ― still en-
gages philosophers today and provides a sensible alternative to the 
individualistic tradition of Western ethics. However, long before 
Watsuji posited that the locus of ethics could not be found in ‘indi-
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vidual consciousness alone,’ and that ethical questions of conscious-
ness must include nature and society, Confucian philosophers had 
also asserted the same. Although not explicitly addressing the issue 
of individual consciousness, (Chinese and Japanese) Confucians of-
tentimes pointed to the mutually defining dynamic between hu-
mans and their milieu. 2
As this paper will show, Watsuji’s later-career quest for an ethi-
cal philosophy that counterbalances the individualistic tradition of 
Western ethics seems to have been underrun by two important ele-
ments: his attempt to define ethics within the framework of an or-
ganismic, non-dualistic dynamic between the universal (fuhensei) 
and particular (tokushusei) on the one hand, and his interest in Con-
fucianism on the other. Yet, as I discussed elsewhere, these Confu-
cian intensions of his ethics are far less explored in contemporary 
scholarship than his debt to Buddhist or Western philosophy. 3  
Therefore, by focusing on the relationship between these two un-
derrunning ― yet seemingly separate ― elements in his philoso-
phy of ethics, my paper will attempt to explore this Confucian di-
mension of Watsuji’s ethics. I will do so by discussing three essays: 
Ethics (Rinrigaku), Confucius (Kōshi), and The History of Ethical 
Thought in Japan (Nihon rinri shisōshi).
The three essays were not published in the order presented here. 
Watsuji published the first volume of Rinrigaku first and set about 
writing Kōshi before moving on to the second volume. Nihon rinri 
shisōshi was published last, in 1952, largely as a compilation of re-
vised earlier essays, but also containing a freshly written Preface and 
a few additional chapters about the modern period. However, in or-
der to clarify Watsuji’s debt to Confucian ethics and the role it 
played in the development of his dynamic of the universal-in-par-
ticular-and-particular-in-universal, the Preface to Nihon rinri shisōshi 
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(published last among the three essays) will be discussed first. 
Here, Watsuji explores this dynamic in detail, while also present-
ing his take on the role of Confucianism in the history of Japanese 
ethical thought. The second part of the paper will introduce 
Rinrigaku and explain both the Confucian dimension of his main 
ethical categories, as well as the essay’s place within the framework 
of Watsuji’s universal-in-particular-and-particular-in-universal dy-
namic. The last essay to be analyzed is Kōshi, where his interest in 
Confucian ethics and its role in the above dynamic manifests itself 
in the form of a philological analysis of Confucius’ Analects. In the 
concluding part of the paper, I will discuss the role Confucianism 
played in Watsuji’s philosophy of ethics with reference to this dy-
namic relationship between universal and particular.
I. Nihon rinri shisōshi
Although different aspects of the universal-in-particular-and-
particular-in-universal dynamic appear throughout Watsuji’s ethical 
writings, it is not until the Preface to the 1952 Nihon rinri shisōshi 
that he sets down a more detailed explanation of its principles. 
Here, he uses this dynamic to explore the history of ethical thought 
and its relationship to the philosophy of ethics, thus also offering 
an interpretation framework for his own philosophical system.
Universality (fuhensei), Watsuji posits, can only manifest itself in 
the form of particularity (tokushusei); any manifestation of a universal 
phenomenon can only take a particular form, a form which is nec-
essarily bound by the time and place of its manifestation. 4  Conse-
quently, any attempted definition of ethics must also take into ac-
count this principle and differentiate between two types of ethics: 
first of all, there is one, universal ethics (rinri), which applies to hu-
manity in its entirety. However, when this universal ethics mani-
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fests itself in any given milieu, it cannot escape its own historicity; 
therefore, it can only manifest itself as an ethical thought (rinri shisō) 
which necessarily takes the form of the socio-historical context it 
appears in. Consequently, the study of ethics also needs to have two 
separate categories: a history of ethical thought (rinri shisōshi) and an 
ethics (rinrigaku). In this sense, gaku represents philosophy, argu-
mentation, the search for principles and patterns, whereas shisōshi 
represents all sources of ethical thinking (or teachings). The cate-
gory of rinrigaku is something akin to rationality, in that it origi-
nates in the skepticism towards the (ethical) teachings of the sages; 
this skepticism is only the starting point of an endless effort to 
reach the core (origin) of the sages’ teachings and to grasp the prin-
ciples of rinri, the universal ethics. In any given historical period, 
rinrigaku can be defined as the understanding of rinri, which tran-
scends the situatedness (tokushuteki gentei) of rinrishisō.
However, Watsuji stresses an important aspect of this dynamic: 
the relationship between the universal and the particular is never 
unidirectional (universal-in-particular), but always mutual (univer-
sal-in-particular-and-particular-in-universal). Just as universality 
only manifests itself in the form of particularity, the reverse also ap-
plies ― localized (national) ethical thinking can only be consid-
ered ethics only insofar as it aims at universality.
It is within this framework, then, that we can read these three 
essays of Watsuji’s together ― as a career-long attempt to define 
ethics in terms of an organismic, non-dualistic dynamic between 
universal and particular. In this sense, his Rinrigaku could be read as 
an exploration of the ‘universal’ element of ethics, Nihon rinri 
shisōshi as an attempt to grasp the ‘particular,’ and Kōshi as a case-
study of the organismic workings of this dynamic. It also seems 
relevant to note here that it is within this context that Watsuji 
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carves an important role for Edo-period Confucianism in the intel-
lectual history of Japanese ethical thought, by hinting at its uni-
versalistic aspects: in Japan, where a discipline called ethics 
(rinrigaku) did not exist as such until the modern period, he credits 
Confucianism with being the closest thing to such an endeavor. In 
other words, he credits the Confucians of the Edo period with at-
tempting to grasp the principles of universal ethics, rinri, thus un-
veiling a certain affinity for them, as well as situating them as his 
precursors, in a sense.
II. Rinrigaku
As mentioned earlier, Nihon rinri shisōshi and Rinrigaku repre-
sent, in a way, the two essential pillars of Watsuji’s philosophical 
system, and are intricately woven together: while Nihon rinri 
shisōshi attempts to uncover the particular expression of universal 
ethical principles in Japan, Rinrigaku is the purely philosophical 
investigation of those universal ethical principles. Therefore, exam-
ining the latter within Watsuji’s larger framework of the universal-
in-particular-and-particular-in-universal dynamic unveils impor-
tant nuances about his philosophical ‘debt’ to Confucianism. 
However, as I have explored this Confucian dimension of the essay 
elsewhere, 5  I will only summarize the relevant points below.
In defining ethics (rinri) as ‘the order or the pattern through 
which the communal existence of human beings is rendered possi-
ble,’ ‘the laws of social existence,’ 6  Watsuji directly references here 
the Confucian realm of human relationships. Yet, his use of this so-
cial framework is not limited to its historical particularity (i.e. the 
types of social relations representative of old Chinese society), but 
it is rather interpreted in its universalistic form, as ‘the grand rin of 
human beings,’ i.e. ‘the most important kinds of human relation-
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ships.’
Watsuji opposes this definition of ethics to ‘the misconception, 
prevalent in the modern world, that conceives of ethics as a prob-
lem of individual consciousness only,’ based on the individualistic 
conception of the human being and which attempts to ‘consider 
the notion of the individual that constitutes only one moment of 
human existence and then substitutes it for the notion of the totali-
ty of ningen.’ 7  But ethics cannot limit itself to the issue of individ-
ual consciousness, because the human being is by their very nature 
a social animal and cannot be separated from their social relation-
ships. Consequently, ethics too needs to comprise the social dimen-
sion of the human being, together with the entirety of its textures. 
In this sense, Watsuji defines ethics as ‘the way inherent in human 
relations,’ which concerns itself with ‘those problems that prevail 
between persons’. 8
Yet, the relationship between the individual and society is not a 
dualistic one, but an organismic one, as expressed by the Japanese 
term ningen (in its literal meaning): ‘It must be that a human being 
is capable of being an individual and, at the same time, also a 
member of society.’ Therefore, Watsuji says, the ‘study of ningen’ 
and the ‘study of society’ are inseparable, and ethics should concern 
itself with the ‘study of the human,’ without the primary distinction 
between the individual and society. 9  In other words, Watsuji’s individ-
ual and society (their milieu) are part of an organismic dynamic, 
ningen sonzai, which mirrors the dynamic of the universal-in-partic-
ular-and-particular-in-universal: ningen is the ‘public and, at the 
same time, the individual human beings living within it;’ the word 
‘refers not merely to an individual human being nor merely to society;’ 
oneself and the other are ‘absolutely separated from each other but, 
nevertheless, become one in communal existence. Individuals are 
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basically different from society and yet dissolve themselves into so-
ciety.’10 His subsequent clarification of the linguistic ‘ambiguity’ 
concerning the whole and the parts of human existence also points 
to this type of dynamic: for example, nakama can also express a 
group or a single nakama; roto as a group and the individuals be-
longing to a group; the same goes for tomodachi (friends), heitai (sol-
diers) or renshu (a party). Thus, Watsuji concludes, ‘in so far as hu-
man existence is concerned, the whole exists in the parts and the parts 
in the whole.’11 12
The presence of these ideas in Rinrigaku suggest that the dynam-
ic later detailed in the Preface to Nihon rinri shisōshi were already 
there, and he continued to explore its various mechanisms and nu-
ances throughout his later academic career.
III. Kōshi
If in Rinrigaku and Nihon rinri shisōshi he explores the two non-
binary poles of universality and particularity in ethics (Rinrigaku as 
the search for the ‘universal’ element of the dynamic, and Nihon 
rinri shisoshi as the search for its ‘particular’ one), in Kōshi Watsuji 
seems to take a markedly different approach to exploring the mecha-
nisms of the universal-in-particular-and-particular-in-the-universal 
dynamic, choosing a philological perspective. Again, he turns here 
to Confucianism, this time focusing on Confucius and his Ana-
lects.13
In the introductory part, Watsuji sets out to analyze the process 
by which Buddha, Jesus, Confucius, and Socrates came to be called 
‘humanity’s Teachers’ (jinrui no kyōshi), despite their historical situ-
atedness14 ― in other words, the process by which they achieved 
ethical universality despite their particularity. In the dynamic of the 
universal-in-particular-and-particular-in-the-universal, the relation-
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ship between the two elements is bidirectional ― just like univer-
sal ethics can only emerge in the form of the particular, particular 
ethics necessarily aims at universality, although it might not always 
achieve it. The case of the Four Teachers represents one such rare 
example, in which the teacher of a small ancient community has 
become the teacher of an extended cultural realm and ultimately of 
the entire humanity. In time, Watsuji notes, their cultural specific-
ity crystallized to the extent of becoming unbound from their (cul-
tural) particularity. But how did this process take place?
Watsuji starts his argument from the apparent contradiction that 
humanity ― as the furthest thing from a unified society ― has 
come to recognize these four figures as universal: what makes one 
person representative of an entire cultural sphere (Jesus for Europe, 
Socrates for Greece, Buddha for India, and Confucius for China), 
given that cultures ― by their very nature ― have almost limit-
lessly diverse sources to draw from? And what makes people ulti-
mately choose and accept that one individual as representative? Ac-
cording to Watsuji, the answer to this question lies in the very 
nature of their philosophies ― while embodying universality, they 
also (exquisitely) embody the particularity of their respective cul-
tures. Watsuji is well aware here of the apparent contradiction, and 
makes a point to explain the organismic, non-dualistic nature of 
this dynamic: the expectation that a ‘teacher of humanity’ is purely 
universal, untouched by the particularity of their native culture, and 
that particular cultures do not carry any universal meaning is an ab-
stract and unrealistic stance. In real history, there is no ‘teacher of 
humanity’ whose existence was not embedded in a particular cul-
tural tradition; a human life that does not take as its object their 
own small human organization cannot exist; similarly, it is impossi-
ble to find a particular cultural tradition that does not hold within 
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it a universal meaning (fuhentekina igi). Just as humanity is not one 
monolithic society, the Four Teachers only represent one small 
piece of that whole (zentai no uchi no hon no ichibubun): Confucius 
lived in the lower reaches of the Yellow River; Gautama came from 
the mid-reaches of the Ganges; and Socrates’ conversation partners 
only came from among the citizens of Athens. And yet, they are 
still called the ‘teachers of humanity.’ In their original teachings, 
the concept of ‘world’ (or ‘humanity’) referred only to their limited 
audience, and not to the entirety of humankind; their teachings 
only dealt with the moral life of their community (jinrin no michi) 
and were not intended for the world outside.
Later on, by looking at the lives of Buddha, Jesus, Confucius, 
and Socrates, Watsuji identifies a common pattern of this ‘univer-
salizing’ process: the first stage is represented by a disappearing 
culture which crystallizes in the person and philosophy of one ex-
traordinary individual, generally revolutionary in their thought;15 
the second stage is the process of idealization of that individual; 
and the third stage is their ‘rebirth’ as a teacher of subsequent gen-
erations. I will shortly present these stages below:
1 ) The quality of the teacher’s teachings 
What in these Saints’ teachings gave them the potential of 
reaching universality? Watsuji notes that they are called ‘humani-
ty’s Teachers’ now not because of what they taught their specific 
community, but because of what they can teach people everywhere 
(arayuru hito). However, he clarifies, in their own time, the value of 
their teachings would not have been recognized ― except maybe 
by their disciples; that is because the values they expounded were 
not easily recognizable as wisdom. Therefore, their universality 
came only after a long process, and mostly thanks to the work of 
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their disciples. One important aspect that Watsuji notes about the 
teachings of the Saints is their innovative nature. All these Teachers 
we call symbols of traditional culture today were revolutionary re-
formers in their own time ― Gautama stood against the previously 
stratified four social classes, Jesus against the old Israeli cult and 
towards the understanding of the new jinrin, and Socrates took a 
stand against the Sofists. 
Unlike Jesus and Buddha, Confucius never concerned himself 
with the issues of death, spirit (tamashii), or deities, nor did he 
want to penetrate the Absolute in a religious sense. His Heaven 
doesn’t even have the religious nuance of Socrates’ Daemon. As 
such, he would have appeared as a resolute critic and reformer of 
the religious tradition since the primitive age. Before him, religion, 
morality and politics had all been founded on the respect for the 
Heaven as a ruler of the skies, which bestowed fortune or misfor-
tune, reward or punishment. But Confucius was undisturbed in 
following the Way (jinrin no michi), morality (dōtoku), and he was 
not moved by the dream of immortality or the salvation of his 
soul ― he was only moved by the desire to understand and follow 
the Way. For Confucius, respect for Heaven will bring its good 
graces, but if one follows the right Way, then Heaven will also ap-
prove. In this sense, Watsuji sees Confucius as an innovator in the 
history of ideas, even if this aspect of his teachings was not empha-
sized in his earliest legend.16 His disciples did not focus on the new 
things that Confucius had created, but rather on the ones he re-
vived and established ― and this, says Watsuji, was his disciples’ 
biggest mistake.
2 ) The stage of idealization
Here, Watsuji explains the cultural process of becoming a ‘hu-
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manity’s Teacher:’ the cultural crystallization in the person of one 
Teacher depended on various elements such as the deep impressions 
of the disciples, their respect, the resonance of their teacher’s wis-
dom in later periods, as well as the respect people held for the dis-
ciples’ own teachings. Through the disciples’ effort to deepen their 
master’s teachings and the attention given to his extraordinary 
characteristics, a stage of idealization (risōka) would have been 
reached. This is not an idealization motivated by their desire to em-
bellish his legacy, Watsuji notes, but stems from a genuine desire to 
deepen their understanding, which ultimately led to a strengthen-
ing of the teacher’s influence on his later disciples.
3 ) The ‘rebirth’ as a teacher of following generations
As ages went by, this process of idealization intensified, and ever 
deeper meanings were extracted from the teacher’s words. By this 
stage, the teacher would have become the personification of an ideal 
(risōjin no sugata); therefore, what passed as his biography in this 
stage would not have been the teacher’s actual biography, but the 
understanding of a cultural development. As such, the biographies 
left behind for these Teachers cannot be taken at face value, as they 
are ambiguous and already filtered through the understanding of 
their disciples. Watsuji mentions here that, in Confucius’ case, 
there existed more of a biographic footprint, but even his idealiza-
tion process followed largely the same steps.17
Concluding his argument on Confucius, Watsuji remarks one 
important aspect of this universalizing process and the nature of his-
torical development: when he emerged as a Teacher, Confucius ap-
peared as a crystallization of pre-Qin culture; he lived and taught 
during the Han period, which was different in quality than pre-
Qin; later on, he was evangelized during China’s Golden Age (the 
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Tang and Song periods), which again was very different in quality 
from the Han period. As such, Confucius of the Han period and 
Confucius of the Song period cannot be one and the same. On the 
other hand, the Confucianism of the Han period made Han culture, 
and in the same way, Song Confucianism (Neo-Confucianism) ―
through its special understanding of Confucius’ teachings ― made 
Song culture. Yet, this is also the way in which the milieu-bound 
teachings of Confucius became universal.
Concluding remarks: the Confucian reverberations in Watsu-
ji’s philosophy of ethics
The analysis above reveals two important points about Watsuji’s 
philosophy of ethics: on the one hand, taken together, the three es-
says represent the philosopher’s career-long attempt at defining 
ethics in terms of an organismic, non-dualistic dynamic between 
universal and particular, comprising both its universal(istic) core, as 
well as its culturally-bounded manifestation(s). While the theoreti-
cal grounding of this dynamic doesn’t seem clearly defined at the 
time he wrote Rinrigaku or Kōshi, its core elements seem already 
well established, and all that Nihon rinri shisōshi brings is an explic-
it and comprehensive analysis of its logic. The three essays can thus 
be taken to represent the philosopher’s systematic approach to the 
intricate workings of this universal-in-particular-and-particular-in-
universal dynamic: while in Rinrigaku and Nihon rinri shisōshi he ex-
plores the two non-binary poles of universality and particularity in 
ethics (Rinrigaku as the search for the ‘universal’ element of the dy-
namic, and Nihon rinri shisoshi as the search for its ‘particular’ one), 
in Kōshi he takes a philological approach to exploring the mecha-
nisms of this dynamic.
The second important conclusion that can be drawn from the 
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above analysis is the depth of Watsuji’s engagement with Confu-
cianism throughout this process. While not always explicitly so, 
Confucian ethics seems to have provided Watsuji with the bonding 
element for his entire philosophy of ethics. In Rinrigaku, this influ-
ence is somewhat clearer, as his repeated references to the Confu-
cian dimension of his core ethical categories showed ― ethics as 
concerned not only with individual consciousness alone, but also 
with a ningen’s sonzai, the textures of their social existence. Howev-
er, while less explicit, a Confucian influence also seems to exist in 
the dynamic analyzed in this paper. Earlier, I noted Watsuji’s inter-
est in Confucianism as developing parallelly to his interest in ethics 
and the dynamic of the universal-in-particular-and-particular-in-
universal, as well as the direct reference he makes to Confucianism’s 
universalistic dimension ― both in Kōshi, where he frames his ar-
gument from this specific stance, and in Nihon rinri shisōshi, where 
he points to Confucianism’s function as a rinrigaku of sorts before 
the discipline as such was imported from the West. And although 
the philosopher himself he does not explicitly identify Confucian 
ethics as a source of inspiration for his universal-in-particular dy-
namic, he does suggest it elsewhere in Nihon rinri shisōshi, when 
discussing the works of Edo Confucians Nakae Tōjū and Kumaza-
wa Banzan:
‘The third notable thing is (Banzan’s) clear understanding of the universal and the partic-
ular. The Way is the Heavenly Way of the universe ( 天地の神道 ), and it does not dif-
fer from one country to another. Even if it differs in the way of grasping it or in the way 
of naming it, ‘the substance is the same Heavenly Way of the universe.’ To argue whether 
this is the way of the Chinese saints or the way of the Japanese imperial lineage, is the 
same as claiming that the days and months ― which are the same for all of us ― be-
long (only) to our country. The same principle exists simultaneously in the Way of the 
Chinese Saints, the Way of the Japanese imperial lineage, or the Way of the Great Void 
(taixu). The fact that in Japan the imperial lineage has continued uninterrupted, while 
in China the revolutionary principle of monarch expulsion (hōbatsu kakumei) has ap-
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peared do not represent differences in the essence of the (universal) Way, but mere differ-
ences in national character (kunigara). […] In Banzan’s writings, what Tōjū called “a 
mark that changes depending on place” (tokoro ni yotte shina kawaru ato) is emphasized as 
the realization of the Way which responds to the milieu it emerges in.’18
Taken together, these elements seem to suggest Watsuji’s strong 
commitment to the universalistic dimension of Confucianism 
throughout the development of his philosophy of ethics in his later 
career, and more specifically in the development of his dynamic of 
the universal-in-particular-and-particular-in-universal.
Regarding the reasons for Watsuji’s turn to Confucianism in his 
later career, some accounts suggest that it indicated somewhat of a 
radicalization on the philosopher’s part, and his use of Confucian-
ism has been taken as a sign of philosophical acquiescence, if not 
support, for the totalitarian regime of the prewar period.19 Yet, Ka-
rube Tadashi’s 2020 account of Kōshi offers a more plausible alter-
native, one that is also relevant to the thesis of this paper: in his 
younger days, as he dallied with literature as part of the Shirakaba 
literary circle, Watsuji often kept company with Natsume Sōseki. 
It was only in 1925, at 36, that he was appointed to teach Ethics at 
Kyōto Imperial University, his first step in the academic field and 
most probably the reason for his career-long interest in ethical phi-
losophy and intellectual history. His later trip to Western Europe, 
in 1927, also represented a significant influence on his philosophy 
of ethics. He published Kōshi more than ten years later, in 1939, 
after finishing the first volume of his Rinrigaku and four years into 
his tenure at Tōkyō Imperial University, making it ― as men-
tioned earlier ― his first critical biography of his predecessors 
from the position of ‘a cutting-edge ethicist.’20 It is here where Ka-
rube makes an important note on Watsuji’s early lack of interest in 
(or contact with) Confucianism: unlike the intellectuals of the older 
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generation, Watsuji ― although among the best educated intellec-
tuals of his age ― had been part of the generation of students edu-
cated since primary school in the Meiji educational system. Conse-
quently, his experience of learning kanbun at a kanji juku had been 
minimal, naturally depriving him of the direct engagement with 
the Confucian classics. It also seems that as a student he also did 
not frequent the Chinese philosophy classes, partially because he 
would have had to memorize the Analects before joining, and par-
tially because of his dislike for the ideology of kokumin dōtoku, 
which had perverted Confucian morality and which was dominat-
ing the political and public realms at the time.21 However, follow-
ing his later-career interest in ethics, it seems that he also had a 
change of heart regarding Confucianism, which ― as I have also 
shown here ― he came to incorporate into his ethics of aidagara 
and critique of Western philosophy.
It may seem contradictory that Watsuji turned to Confucianism 
at a time when its ideological use in Japan was at its most insidi-
ous, especially given his career-long dislike for kokumin dōtoku and 
its idealogues. This contradiction is also why the possibility of his 
acquiescence to the militaristic regime cannot be completely set 
aside. But as Karube’s account and my analysis indicate, Watsuji’s 
turn to Confucianism seems to have only happened once he re-
solved the tension between its universalistic and traditionalistic di-
mensions, and only once he started clearly differentiating between 
its philosophical core and its manipulated use by kokumin dōtoku 
ideologues.22 In this sense, as the essays introduced here suggest, 
Watsuji’s engagement with Confucianism seems to have been lim-
ited to its former, universalistic dimension.
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structive relationship for the individual, who risks losing themselves in ‘society’. This is also 
one of the main criticisms brought against his philosophy of ethics in the postwar period. See, 
for example, Bellah’s position in his 1965 essay, Japan’s cultural Identity: Some Reflections on the 
Work of Watsuji Tetsurō: ‘Watsuji, as he himself was later fully aware, made no effective resis-
tance to the tendencies leading Japan to disaster. Indeed, the position which he had worked out 
he did not give any basis for individual or social resistance. ［…］ The new gemeinschaft commu-
nity which he held up as an ideal was no effective answer to any contemporary Japanese prob-
lem and in fact blended easily into the rightist rhetoric which was coming to dominate the 
country. Similarly, the absolute negativity which Watsuji found at the basis of human existence 
gave no effective foundation for individual nonconformism. ［…］ Even more fundamental, per-
haps, is the lack in Watsuji’s system of any universalistic or transcendental standard relative to 
which individual or social action can be judged.’ (Bellah 1965:589)
12 In terms of the larger framework of ethics as a universal-in-particular-and-particular-in-uni-
versal type of dynamic, he says the following: ‘A ningen’s sonzai is essentially spatio-temporal. It 
forms a system of social ethics in some place, and at some period of time. Apart from land and a 
specific time period, a system of social ethics would turn out to be a mere abstraction. ［…］ 
family ties occur in the ‘home,’ connections of neighbors in the ‘village,’ and links of friendship 
in their ‘town.’ And the home, the village, and the town are all burdened with historical tradi-
tion and recreate their history day by day.’ (Rinrigaku: 25-6).
13 Although not necessarily mentioned alongside Rinrigaku and Nihon rinri shisōshi, this essay 
also occupies a rather important place in Japanese intellectual history; and it is not only be-
cause, as Karube 2020 notes, it is ‘the first critical biography of his predecessors published by 
Watsuji in his quality of a cutting-edge ethicist,’ (Karube 2020:162) but also because it repre-
sents one of the earliest examples of modern philological studies on Confucius (Fujita 2020:10).
14 Watsuji refers to them ― more or less interchangeably ― as either the Four Teachers ( 人類
の教師 ) or the Four Saints ( 人類の四聖 )
15 So not representative of the ‘traditional’ element of that culture, but of the ‘creative’ one.
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16 Watsuji blames Confucius’ disciples for not recognizing or acknowledging the revolutionary 
aspect of his thought ― he notes here that instead of focusing on the innovative things that 
Confucius had created, they preferred to focus on the ones he revived and established.
17 Watsuji takes here the example of Mencius, who approached the Teacher’s texts philologically 
and addressed the contradictions and falsities in it. From Mencius’ critical approach to the Ana-
lects, Watsuji concludes that during that epoch, some 150 years after his death, Confucius’ leg-
end was most probably being built, and Mencius was trying to fight this process in order to re-
veal Confucius himself. In this sense, Watsuji’s point here is about the necessity to approach 
myth critically ― while the idealization process uncovers important universal dimensions of 
the Teachers’ words, it also needs to be approached critically, as it is ultimately a cultural fabri-
cation.
18 Watsuji 2011: 265-6.




22 Throughout his career ― including after WWII, when it had become fashionable to recant 
earlier (and more regime-appeasing) philosophical positions ― , Watsuji did not renounce the 
idea of a national morality or reverence for the emperor as symbols of cultural unity, or the 
Confucian elements of his philosophy (these are also among the arguments frequently brought 
against him by postwar liberal intellectuals). However, his position is markedly different from 
that of his prewar contemporaries, and his criticism of them always vocal. The major failings he 
identifies in the philosophical position of the kokumin dōtokuronsha is detailed in the concluding 
chapters of Nihon rinri shisōshi: on the one hand, the anachronistic use of Edo-period Confucian 
ethical concepts to artificially create a simulacrum of nationhood, the failure to separate objec-
tive historic study from ideological fabrication (this particular criticism he aims at his teacher, 
Inoue Tetsujirō), or the failure to understand the dynamic relationship between universal and 
national ethics (for more details on this specific point, see Sevilla 2017:141-4).
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